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Probabilistically Robust SWIPT for Secrecy MISOME Systems
Muhammad R. A. Khandaker, Kai-Kit Wong, Yangyang Zhang,
and Zhongbin Zheng
Abstract—This paper considers simultaneous wireless infor-
mation and power transfer (SWIPT) in a multiple-input single-
output (MISO) downlink system consisting of one multi-antenna
transmitter, one single-antenna information receiver (IR), mul-
tiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers (Eves) and multiple single-
antenna energy-harvesting receivers (ERs). The main objective
is to keep the probability of the legitimate user’s achievable
secrecy rate outage as well as the ERs’ harvested energy outage
caused by channel state information (CSI) uncertainties below
some prescribed thresholds. As is well known, the secrecy
rate outage constraints present a significant analytical and
computational challenge. Incorporating the energy harvesting
(EH) outage constraints only intensifies that challenge. In this
paper, we address this challenging issue using convex restriction
approaches which are then proved to yield rank-one optimal
beamforming solutions. Numerical results reveal the effectiveness
of the proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
RESEARCHERS have long been investigating conven-tional ambient energy resources, such as solar and wind,
for energising low-power electronic devices. However, the spo-
radic and unpredictable nature of these ambient sources makes
energy harvesting critical for applications where quality-of-
service (QoS) is of priority, and most of these conventional
harvesting technologies are only applicable in certain envi-
ronments and/or weather conditions [1]. On the other hand,
wireless power transfer via magnetic induction is not yet a
viable means for widespread applications due to its extremely
short distance of power transfer.
Recently, simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) has received enormous interest triggered
by the prospects of powering energy-limited wireless devices
via RF energy harvesting (EH) due to reductions in power
requirements of electronics [2]–[5]. As RF signals transport
information and energy sumultaneously, mobile users are
actually blessed with access to both energy and data at the
same time through SWIPT. Surprisingly, this fact did not
attract much attention until as late as the last decade.
A practical challenge for SWIPT is that information and
energy receiver (ER) circuits operate at very different power
sensitivity level (e.g., −10dBm for ERs versus −60dBm for
information receivers (IRs)). To store a useful amount of en-
ergy from harvesting, the ERs need access to a higher receive
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power. Due to this incompatibility between the two forms of
receivers, two practical schemes, namely, time switching (TS)
and power splitting (PS) have been proposed in the literature in
order to enable SWIPT [2], [3], [6]. In particular, the authors
of [2] investigated both schemes in a multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) broadcasting scenario from a base station (BS)
to two mobile receivers decoding information and harvesting
energy at the same time. Although the TS scheme simplifies
the receiver design, it compromises the efficiencies of the
SWIPT technology since the receivers decode information
and harvest energy in alternating time slots. Thus, in [3],
only the PS-based receiver architecture has been rigorously
studied for SWIPT in a point-to-point system. The PS-based
schemes have also been considered for multiple-input single-
output (MISO) SWIPT multicasting systems with perfect as
well as imperfect channel state information (CSI) in [6] and
for MIMO multicasting systems in [7].
Nevertheless, due to channel fading, wireless power transfer
efficiency decays drastically as the transmitter-receiver dis-
tance increases. Since multiple-antenna techniques provide ad-
ditional degrees of freedom (DoF) exploiting spatial diversity,
installing multiple antennas can help combat channel fading
in order to improve wireless power transfer efficiency [2].
In order to further improve EH efficiency, a receiver-location
based near-far scheduling scheme has also been proposed in
the SWIPT literature for information and energy transmissions
[2], [8], in which the receivers only in closer vicinity to
the transmitter are scheduled for harvesting energy. Although
the scheme apparently seems to be beneficial for EH, actu-
ally it gives rise to an undesired security vulnerability for
transmitting secret information in scenarios where ERs are
supposed to be kept in the dark about the secret message.
Specifically, ERs in the scheme have better fading channels
than IRs and thus have higher probability to successfully
decode the information sent to the IRs [9], [10]. On the other
hand, the transmitter often needs to apply higher power in
order to satisfy ERs’ EH requirements which they normally do
not need for information-only transmission. This makes secret
messages susceptible to external eavesdropping attack as well.
Information secrecy can be further degraded if the ERs start
cooperating in order to perform joint decoding in an attempt
to improve their interception. Thus, the SWIPT systems need
to be carefully designed in order to be able to successfully
transfer secret messages keeping the potential eavesdroppers
ignorant of the secret message to the IR.
To make sure that the message is delivered secretly to the IR
in a SWIPT system taking possible eavesdropping by the ERs
into consideration, MISO secrecy beamforming schemes were
proposed in [9]–[11]. It was assumed in [9] that the ERs do
not collude to perform joint decoding and that the CSI of all
2the nodes, including the eavesdroppers, was perfectly known
at the transmitter. Nonetheless, in order to guarantee maximum
information secrecy, it would be more meaningful to consider
the worst-case scenario, where the ERs collude together to
attempt to decode the data jointly such that the eavesdropping
rate is maximized. Also, obtaining the eavesdroppers’ CSI
perfectly is practically impossible. Hence the authors in [10],
[11] considered robust design based on deterministic channel
uncertainty models for SWIPT in scenarios where the ERs may
collude together to perform joint decoding in an attempt to
improve their interception. In [12], [13], physical layer security
was studied for SWIPT in OFDMA networks.
Other works with secrecy in SWIPT either considered
worst-case robust approaches in which the CSI errors are
assumed to be within a bounded set, or correlation-based
approaches in which the channel statistics is available. A
delay-limited secrecy SWIPT system was considered in [14]
with single-antenna nodes, while a randomization-guided rank-
one suboptimal solution was proposed in [15] for worst-case
MISO secrecy SWIPT systems, and in [16] for MIMO SWIPT
systems. Worst-case based MISO secrecy SWIPT optimization
has also been considered in [17] for norm-bounded channel
uncertainty model based on successive convex approximation
approach.
Unfortunately, due to inaccurate channel estimation meth-
ods, it may not always be possible that the legitimate trans-
mitter obtains these deterministic models perfectly [18]. In
such cases, secrecy as well as EH outage may occur. Hence,
this paper considers robust secrecy optimization problems with
probabilistic secrecy rate and EH constraints for MISO sys-
tems with multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers (MISOME).
Two probabilistic secrecy beamforming design problems have
been considered namely (1) minimizing the transmit power
subject to probabilistic QoS constraints, and (2) maximizing
the secrecy rate subject to the total transmit power and secrecy
and EH outage constraints. In contrast to the determinis-
tic (worst- or average-case) models [9]–[11], [14]–[17], this
approach offers a safe performance, guaranteeing a certain
chance of successful QoS deliveries.
Our main objective is to maintain the probability of the legit-
imate user’s achievable secrecy rate outage as well as the ERs’
harvested energy outage caused by CSI uncertainties below
given thresholds. As is already well known, the secrecy rate
outage constraints present a significant analytical and compu-
tational challenge. Inclusion of the EH outage constraints only
proliferates that challenge. Unfortunately, quadratic chance
constraints generally do not have closed-form expressions, and
are unlikely to be tractable. Therefore, it is quite common
in the robust optimization literature to develop safe tractable
approximations of the outage-based QoS constraints that are
computationally efficient and are good in accuracies. Moti-
vated by this, in this paper, we present three conservative
approximation approaches namely, Bernstein-type inequality
(BTI), S-procedure, and large deviation inequality (LDI) [19]–
[22] based approaches in order to transform the probabilistic
constraints into safe and tractable ones.
Applying semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique, we show
that the safe approximation results always yield rank-one
optimal transmit covariance solution for the IR. Our simulation
results also reveal that the BTI-based restriction approach is
the best and the conventional S-procedure based approach is
comparatively the worst strategy in terms of secrecy rates,
whereas the LDI-based approach appears to be a good com-
promise. Note that [23] considered secure robust transmit
beamforming design for minimizing the total transmit power
under QoS constraints including SINR and SINR outage
constraints at the eavesdroppers. The nonconvex probabilistic
constraint was replaced with a tractable convex deterministic
constraint by bounding the radius of the uncertainty region
(comparable to our S-procedure based approach). However,
[23] did not explicitly consider the secrecy rate or EH outage
constraints, which are much more challenging to deal with but
of great importance to SWIPT systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model of a secret MISO SWIPT network is
introduced. The secrecy rate constrained (SRC) power mini-
mization problem is discussed in Section III for the imperfect
CSI case whereas in Section IV, solutions to the secrecy
rate maximization (SRM) problem are derived. Section V
presents the simulation results that justify the significance of
the proposed algorithms under various scenarios. Concluding
remarks are provided in Section VI.
Notations—Throughout this paper, we use the following
notations. Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters are used
to represent vectors and matrices, respectively. The symbol
In denotes an n × n identity matrix, 0 is a zero vector or
matrix. Also, AH , tr(A), rank(A), and |A| represent the
Hermitian (conjugate) transpose, trace, rank and determinant
of a matrix A; Pr[·] represents the probability of an event;
‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖F represent the Euclidean norm and Frobenius
norm, respectively; A  0 (A ≻ 0) means that A is a
Hermitian positive semidefinite (definite) matrix. The notation
x ∼ CN (µ,Σ) means that x is a random vector following a
complex circularly symmetric Gaussian distribution with mean
vector µ and covariance matrix Σ.
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Fig. 1. A MISO SWIPT system with multiple-antenna eavesdroppers.
3II. SYSTEM MODEL
A MISO downlink system is considered for SWIPT with
K + L + 1 receivers as shown in Fig. 1. The BS transmits
information to a legitimate user and energy to K EH receivers
keeping the information as secure as possible from L eaves-
droppers (Eves). It is assumed that the BS performs necessary
user selection operation before transmission begins for decod-
ing information. Note that similar assumption has also been
made in numerous existing works in the secrecy literature for
SWIPT, e.g., [9]–[11], [14]–[17]. The transmitter or BS has
NT > 1 transmitting antennas and each legitimate receiver
(IR or ER) has single receiving antenna. Eves are equipped
with Ne,i antennas for i = 1, . . . , L. The BS performs linear
transmit beamforming to send secret information to the IR. We
assume that the ERs are also legitimate users of the network
authorized for EH only and do not intend to overhear the
message destined to the IR.1 By letting x be the transmit signal
vector, the received signals at the IR, the kth ER, and the ith
Eve can be modeled, respectively, as
yd = h
Hx+ nd, (1)
yh,k = g
H
k x+ nh,k, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
ye,i = H
H
e,ix+ ne,i, for i = 1, . . . , L, (3)
where h, gk, and He,i are the conjugated complex channel
vector (matrix) between the BS and the IR, the kth ER, and
the ith Eve, respectively, nd ∼ CN (0, σ2d), nh,k ∼ CN (0, σ2h),
and ne,l ∼ CN (0, σ2eINl) are the additive Gaussian noises
at the IR, the kth ER, and the ith Eve, respectively. For
notational simplicity, the path loss factors Pf,d =
√
Lcd
−κ¯
I ,
Pf,hk =
√
Lcd
−κ¯
h,k, and Pf,ei =
√
Lcd
−κ¯
e,i , with the path loss
constant Lc = GTGR
(
c
4pif
)2
(in which GT and GR are the
antenna gains of the transmitter and the receivers, respectively,
c is the speed of light, and f is the carrier frequency), dI,
dh,k, and de,i indicating the distance of the IR, kth ER, and
ith Eve, respectively, from the BS, and κ¯ (typically between
2.7 and 3.5) being the path loss exponent, are all assumed
to be absorbed in the corresponding channel gains. The BS
chooses x as x = bIsI where sI ∼ CN (0, 1) is the confidential
information-bearing signal for the IR and bI is the transmit
beamforming vector. Hence, x is a beamformed version of the
message.
Note that multi-antenna eavesdroppers may interchangeably
mean that single-antenna eavesdroppers located in a favourable
location to cooperate may collude together to improve their
interception. For ease of exposition, we further assume that
all the Eves are colluding into multiple groups. In particular,
Eves are assumed to perform joint maximum signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) receive beamforming. By denotingQI , bIbHI as
the transmit covariance matrix, the mutual information (MI)
between the BS and the IR is given by
CI (QI) = log
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
, (4)
1The results of this paper are readily extendible to study the impacts of
untrusted ERs on the SWIPT system performance.
and that between the BS and the colluded Eves is given by
Ce,i (QI) = log
∣∣∣∣INe,i + 1σ2eHHe,iQIHe,i
∣∣∣∣ , for i = 1, . . . , L.
(5)
Given QI, the achievable secrecy rate is given by [24]
Cs = min
i
{CI (QI)− Ce,i (QI)}+ , (6)
where {a}+ = max(0, a). The harvested power at the kth ER
is given by
Ek = ξkg
H
k QIgk, (7)
where ξk ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency of the
energy transducers at the kth ER. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the harvested energy due to the background noise at the
EH receivers in (7) is negligible and as a consequence can be
ignored [2].
In most of the existing works with secrecy for SWIPT,
it is assumed that the instantaneous CSI of all the receivers
is available at the transmitter. However, in practical wireless
communication systems, perfect CSI is likely not available
and an important issue is how to robustify a secure transmit
design in the presence of imperfect CSI. As a consequence,
our next exertion is to develop convex optimization algorithms
that satisfy given chance constraints exploiting only imperfect
CSI knowledge.
III. ROBUST POWER MINIMIZATION WITH PROBABILISTIC
CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we develop probabilistically robust algo-
rithm for the SRC problem with secrecy rate and EH outage
constraints. The interest here is in active Eves cases, where
the Eves themselves are also users of the network and the
transmitter aims to provide different services to different types
of users. That is, the Eves are legitimate users for utilities
other than the particular information destined to the IR. For
such active eavesdroppers, the CSI can be estimated from the
eavesdroppers’ transmission. Thus we assume that the BS has
incomplete knowledge of the ERs’ as well as Eves’ channels
while the IR’s channel is perfectly known. The perfect IR’s
CSI assumption is quite widely exercised in the existing
literature since the legitimate IR’s CSI may be obtained at
very high precision through secure control channels [9], [10],
[16].
We consider the commonly used Gaussian channel error
model for the imperfect CSI. To model the imperfect CSI,
we assume that the actual channels gk, for k = 1, . . . ,K,
lie in the neighbourhood of the estimated channels gˆk, for
k = 1, . . . ,K, available at the transmitter. The channel error
vectors are assumed to have circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian (CSCG) distribution. Thus, the actual channels are
modeled as
gk = gˆk + δg,k, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (8)
where gˆk ∈ CNT×1 is the estimated CSI of the kth ER
and δg,k ∈ CNT×1, for k = 1, . . . ,K, represent the channel
uncertainties such that δg,k ∼ CN (0,Rg,k), in which Rg,k
4is a positive semidefinite matrix. Similarly, the Eves’ channel
uncertainty model can be represented by
He,i = Hˆe,i +∆H,i, for i = 1, . . . , L, (9)
where Hˆe,i ∈ CNT×Ne,i is the estimated CSI of the ith Eve
and ∆H,i ∈ CNT×Ne,i , for i = 1, . . . , L, represent the channel
uncertainties such that δH,i , vec (∆H,i) ∼ CN (0,RH,i),
where RH,i is a positive semidefinite matrix. Thus, the prob-
abilistically robust SRC power minimization problem can be
formulated as
min
QI
tr (QI) (10a)
s.t. Pr
[
min
i
{
CI(QI)−Cˆe,i(QI)
}+
≥R
]
≥1−p,∀i,(10b)
Pr
[
min
k
Eˆk ≥ ηk
]
≥ 1− q, ∀k, (10c)
QI  0, (10d)
where Cˆe,i (QI) = log
∣∣∣INe,i + 1σ2eHHe,iQIHe,i
∣∣∣ is the ith
Eves’ MI with He,i = Hˆe,i +∆H,i, for i = 1, . . . , L, δH,i ,
vec (∆H,i) ∼ CN (0,RH,i) and Eˆk = ξkgHk QIgk is the
average energy harvested with gk = gˆk + δg,k, for k =
1, . . . ,K, δg,k ∼ CN (0,Rg,k). The problem formulation in
(10) guarantees that the IR can successfully decode its message
at least (1 − p) × 100% of the time. Similarly, the ERs
can harvest the minimum required amount of power at least
(1− q)× 100% of the time. As the desired outage probability
decreases, the size of the feasible sets described by (10b) and
(10c) decreases. Hence, one might expect an increase in the
required transmit power with decreasing outage probabilities.
Notice that the rank constraint on QI has been relaxed
in problem (10). An important issue that arises from the
relaxation is the rank of the resulting solution. The removal
of the rank constraint rank(QI) = 1 means that the solution
obtained through solving problem (10) may have rank higher
than one. A common practice of overcoming this is to apply
some rank approximation procedure (e.g., randomization) to
the optimal Q∗I to find a feasible beamforming solution bI.
However, in this paper, we aim to prove the tightness of the
rank relaxation.
The problem is still nonconvex due to the probabilistic con-
straints involving log det functions. To make those constraints
more tractable, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1 ( [25]). For any positive semidefinite matrix A, the
following inequality holds
|I+A| ≥ 1 + tr(A) (11)
and the equality in (11) holds if and only if rank(A) ≤ 1.
Proof: Let rA = rank(A). While the case of rA = 0 is
trivial, for rA ≥ 1, let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · ·λrA > 0 denote the
nonzero eigenvalues of A. Accordingly, we have that
|I+A| =
rA∏
i=1
(1 + λi) = 1 +
rA∑
i=1
λi +
∑
i6=k
λiλk + . . .
≥ 1 +
rA∑
i=1
λi = 1 + Tr(A).
Clearly, the above equality holds if and only if rA = 1.
Now, by applying Lemma 1, the secrecy rate outage con-
straint (10b) can be relaxed as
Pr
[
log
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
− log
(
1 +
1
σ2e
tr
(
HHe,iQI
×He,i)) ≥ R] ≥ 1− p, ∀i,
which is equivalent to
Pr
[(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
≥ 2R
(
1 +
1
σ2e
tr
(
HHe,iQI
×He,i))] ≥ 1− p, ∀i.
Rearranging the terms in the above equation yields
Pr
[
tr
(
HHe,iQIHe,i
) ≤ σ2e
2R
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
− σ2e
]
≥ 1− p, ∀i. (12)
Replacing He,i = Hˆe,i + ∆H,i, and then performing some
mathematical manipulations, we finally obtain from (12)
Pr
[
tr
(
∆HH,iQI∆H,i +∆
H
H,iQIHˆe,i + Hˆ
H
e,iQI∆H,i
+HˆHe,iQIHˆe,i
)
≤ σ
2
e
2R
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
− σ2e
]
≥ 1− p, ∀i. (13)
Recall that the relaxation (12) is in fact tight according
to Lemma 1 if rank
(
QI
) ≤ 1. Our goal is to reformulate
problem (10) as a tractable convex problem and then prove
that the relaxation in (12) is indeed tight for the chance-
constrained secrecy problem by proving the rank-one structure
of QI. To make the robust problem (10) more tractable to
analyze and solve, we first transform the robust constraints in
(10b) and (10c) into convex inequalities using advanced matrix
inequality results in the optimization literature.
Note that the probability term in (13) does not have a closed-
form expression. Now we apply the following matrix identities
to reformulate the secrecy outage constraint
vec (AXB) =
(
BH ⊗A) vec (X) , (14a)
tr
(
AHB
)
= vec (A)
H
vec (B) , (14b)
(A⊗B)H = AH ⊗BH . (14c)
Applying the identities in (14), we can express (13) as
Pr
[
δHH,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
δH,i + 2ℜ
{
δHH,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
hˆe,i
}
+hˆHe,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i ≤ σ
2
e
2R
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
− σ2e
]
≥ 1−p, ∀i, (15)
where hˆe,i , vec(Hˆe,i). Since δH,i ∼ CN (0,RH,i), δH,i
can be reexpressed as δH,i = R
1
2
H,ivH,i such that vH,i ∼
5CN (0, INTNe,i). Thus, (15) can be reexpressed as
Pr
[
vHH,i
[
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
]
vH,i + 2ℜ
{
vHH,i
×
[
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
hˆe,i
]}
+
σ2e
2R
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
−σ2e − hˆHe,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i ≥ 0
]
≥ 1− p, ∀i. (16)
Similarly, the EH outage constraint can be expressed as
Pr
[
uHg,kR
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,kug,k + 2ℜ
{
uHg,kR
1
2
g,kQIgˆk
}
+gˆHk QIgˆk −
ηk
ξk
≥ 0
]
≥ 1− q, ∀i, (17)
where δg,k = R
1
2
g,kug,k with ug,k ∼ CN (0, INT). In the
following, we tackle these probabilistic constraints pursuing
some convex restriction approaches. Clearly, the constraints
(16) and (17) are of the form:
Pr{eHQe+ 2ℜ{eHr}+ s ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ.
If we can find a convex function f(Q, r, s), such that
Pr{eHQe+ 2ℜ{eHr} + s ≥ 0} ≤ f(Q, r, s),
then we will readily have the implication [21]
f(Q, r, s) ≤ ρ
=⇒ Pr{eHQe+ 2ℜ{eHr}+ s ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ. (18)
Hence, the L.H.S. of the implication in (18) gives a safe
approximation, which is convex, of the generally intractable
probabilistic constraint in the R.H.S. In the following, we
attempt to derive the convex restrictions f(Q, r, s) for tackling
the probabilistic constraints. The derived restriction methods
differ in terms of both computational complexity and tightness.
A. Robust Optimization Based on BTI
The relaxation step alone does not provide a convex approx-
imation of the original problem. The semidefinite probabilistic
constraints remain intractable. In order to make the secrecy and
EH outage constraints more tractable, we consider BTI in this
subsection. The Bernstein-type concentration inequalities play
a central role to transform the probabilistic constraints into
more tractable form based on large deviation inequality for
complex Gaussian quadratic vector functions. For complete-
ness, the inequality theorem is presented in Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2 (BTI). Consider the chance constraint
Pr
[
xHAx+ 2ℜ{xHr}+ θ ≥ 0] ≥ 1− ρ, (19)
where x is a standard complex Gaussian random vector,
i.e., x ∼ CN (0, In), the 3-tuple (A, r, θ) (A ∈ Hn×n is a
complex hermitian matrix, r ∈ Cn, b ∈ R) forms a set of
deterministic optimization variables, and ρ ∈ (0, 1] is fixed.
The following implication holds [19]:
Pr
[
xHAx+ 2ℜ{xHr}+ θ ≥ 0] ≥ 1− ρ
⇐=


tr (A)−
√
−2 ln(ρ)ψ + ln(ρ)ω + θ ≥ 0,∥∥∥∥
[
vec (A)√
2r
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ ψ,
ωIn +A  0, ψ, ω ≥ 0,
(20a)
(20b)
(20c)
where ψ, ω ∈ R are slack variables.
Note that (20) is jointly convex in A, ψ, and ω and
represents an efficiently computable convex restriction of the
chance constraint (19). Thus using BTI, we can derive closed-
form upper bounds on the violation probability to construct an
efficiently computable convex function.
Indeed, for each constraint in (16), the following correspon-
dence can be shown for all i:
Ai = −R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i, (21a)
ri = −R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i, (21b)
θi=
σ2e
2R
(
1+
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
−σ2e−hˆHe,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
hˆe,i. (21c)
Based on Lemma 2, a convex safe approximation of the secrecy
rate constraint in (16) can be equivalently represented by
tr
(
R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
)
+ hˆHe,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i − σ
2
e
2R
+
√
−2 ln(p)ψi−ln(p)ωi − σ
2
e
2Rσ2d
hHQIh+ σ
2
e ≤ 0, (22a)∥∥∥∥∥∥

 vec
(
R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
)
√
2R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i


∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ψi, (22b)
ωiINTNe,i−R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i  0, ψi, ωi≥0,∀i, (22c)
and that of the EH outage constraint (17) can be equivalently
recast into
tr
(
R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k
)
+ gˆHk QIgˆk +
√
−2 ln(q)νk − ln(q)ϕk
− ηk
ξk
≥ 0, (23a)∥∥∥∥∥∥

 vec
(
R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k
)
√
2R
1
2
g,kQIgˆk


∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ νk, (23b)
ϕkINT +R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k  0, νk, ϕk ≥ 0, ∀k, (23c)
where q ∈ (0, 1] is fixed, and ν, ϕ ∈ R are slack variables.
Incorporating (22) and (23), the power minimization problem
6(10) can be equivalently reformulated as
min
QI,{ψi},{ωi},{νk},{ϕk}
tr (QI) s.t. (24a)
tr
(
R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
)
+ hˆHe,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i
+
√
−2 ln(p)ψi−ln(p)ωi− σ
2
e
2Rσ2d
hHQIh− σ
2
e
2R
+σ2e ≤0,
(24b)∥∥∥∥∥∥

 vec
(
R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
)
√
2R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
hˆe,i


∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ψi, (24c)
ωiINTNe,i −R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i  0, (24d)
tr
(
R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k
)
+ gˆHk QIgˆk −
√
−2 ln(q)νk
+ ln(q)ϕk − ηk
ξk
≥ 0, (24e)∥∥∥∥∥∥

 vec
(
R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k
)
√
2R
1
2
g,kQIgˆk


∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ νk, (24f)
ϕkINT +R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k  0, (24g)
QI  0, ψi, ωi ≥ 0, ∀i, νk, ϕk ≥ 0, ∀k. (24h)
The problem (24) is convex and can be efficiently solved using
interior-point based solvers [26].
Theorem 1. Suppose that the relaxed problem (24) is feasible
for R > 0. The optimal solution must satisfy rank(QI) = 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. S-Procedure Based Approach
In this subsection, we develop a convex restriction approach
in a conservative fashion for robust optimization. The main
idea is to choose a set for the channel uncertainty region
satisfying the probabilistic restriction. In contrast to norm-
bounded CSI errors, we have the freedom to choose the set
arbitrarily in this method according to the maximum tolerable
outage probability. Towards this end, the following lemma is
useful.
Lemma 3. Consider an arbitrary set A ⊂ CNT×1 satisfying
Pr {x ∈ A} ≥ 1− ρ. The following implication holds [21]:
xHAx+ 2ℜ{xHr}+ θ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ A,
=⇒ Pr{xHQx+ 2ℜ{xHr}+ θ ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ. (25)
That is, the worst-case robust constraint on the L.H.S. of
(25) is a safe approximation of the probabilistic constraint on
the R.H.S. Based on Lemma 3, given the following determin-
istic quadratic constraint (from (16))
vHH,i
[
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
]
vH,i + 2ℜ
{
vHH,i
[
−R 12H,i
× (INe,i ⊗QI)] hˆe,i}+ σ2e2R
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
− σ2e
− hˆHe,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i ≥ 0, ∀i, (26)
choosing the following set for the channel uncertainty region
A = {vH,i ∈ CNT×1|Pr
(
vHH,ivH,i ≤ γ2e
) ≥ 1− p}, ∀i, (27)
is sufficient to guarantee the probabilistic constraint in (16).
Interestingly, with vH,i defined as vH,i ∼ CN
(
0, INTNe,i
)
, it
can be easily verified that ‖vH,i‖2 is a Chi-square (χ2) random
variable with 2NTNe,i degrees of freedom. The channel uncer-
tainty region in (27) always holds for γe =
√
F−1
χ2m
(1−p)
2 , where
F−1
χ2m
(a) is the inverse cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the Chi-square random variable a with m = 2NTNe,i
degrees of freedom. In fact, γe,i can be interpreted as the radius
of the ball A defining the channel uncertainty region. Thus the
probabilistic constraint (16) can be equivalently expressed by
the following set of inequalities:
vHH,i
[
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
]
vH,i + 2ℜ
{
vHH,i
[
−R 12H,i
× (INe,i⊗QI)] hˆe,i}+ σ2e2R
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
− σ2e
− hˆHe,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i ≥ 0, ∀i, (28a)
− vHH,ivH,i + γ2e ≥ 0, ∀i. (28b)
At this point, we apply the so-called S-procedure [27] to
transform the constraint (28) into a more tractable linear matrix
inequality (LMI). The S-procedure is presented in Lemma 4
below.
Lemma 4 (S-Procedure). Let fi(x), i = 1, 2, be defined as
fi(x) = x
HAix+ 2ℜ
{
bHi x
}
+ ci, (29)
where Ai ∈ Cn×n,bi ∈ Cn, ci ∈ R. The implication f1(x) ≤
0 ⇒ f2(x) ≤ 0 holds if and only if there exists µ ≥ 0 such
that
µ
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
−
[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
 0 (30)
provided that there exists a point xˆ such that f1(xˆ) < 0.
According to Lemma 4, (28) holds if and only if there exists
µH,i ≥ 0, ∀i, such that Θi (QI, µH,i)  0 (defined in (31) at
the top of the page) where τH,i , σ
2
e
2R
(
1 + 1
σ2
d
hHQIh
)
−σ2e−
hˆHe,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i, ∀i.
Similarly, the EH outage constraint (17) can be transformed
to the LMI in (32) where µg,k ≥ 0, ∀k. By exploiting
S-Procedure, the power minimization problem (10) can be
equivalently reformulated as
min
QI,{µH,i},{µg,k}
tr (QI) (33a)
s.t. Θi (QI, µH,i)  0, ∀i, (33b)
Υk (QI, µg,k)  0, ∀k, (33c)
QI0, µH,i≥0, ∀i, µg,k ≥ 0, ∀k. (33d)
The SDP problem (33) is convex and can be efficiently
solved using interior-point based solvers [26]. Interestingly,
the following theorem states that the relaxed problem (33)
always yields a rank-one transmit beamforming solution.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the relaxed problem (33) is feasible
for R > 0. The optimal solution must satisfy rank(QI) = 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
7Θi (QI, µH,i) ,
[
µH,iINTNe,i −R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i −R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
hˆe,i
−hˆHe,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i τH,i − µH,iγ2e
]
 0, (31)
Υk (QI, µg,k) ,
[
µg,kINT +R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k R
1
2
g,kQIgˆk
gˆHk QIR
1
2
g,k gˆ
H
k QIgˆk − ηkξk − µg,kγ2e
]
 0, (32)
Remark. At this point, we would like to comment that the
BTI-based approach has higher computational complexity
compared to the S-procedure based approach as the for-
mer involves a more compound mixture of different types of
constraints [21]. However, we will perform a full complexity
analysis later in this section.
C. LDI Based Approach
Since the BTI and S-procedure based approaches transform
the chance-constrained optimization problem (10) into SDPs,
the resulting safe designs are polynomial-time solvable [27].
The SDPs can, however, be very expensive to solve if the size
of the LMI constraints in (24) and (33) is sufficiently large.
Hence in this subsection, our endeavour is to develop convex
restrictions involving simpler conic constraints. The method
follows from the decomposition-based LDI [28] for complex
Gaussian quadratic functions as defined in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. [21, Lemma 2] Let x ∼ CN (0, In) be a standard
complex Gaussian random vector, and let A ∈ Hn×n and r ∈
Cn be given. Then, for any v > 1√
2
and ζ > 0, we have
Pr
{
xHAx+ 2Re{xHr} ≤ tr(A)− ζ}
≤


exp
(
− ζ24T 2
)
for 0 < ζ ≤ 2v¯vT,
exp
(
− v¯vζ
T
+ (v¯v)2
)
for ζ > 2v¯vT,
(34)
where v¯ = 1− 12v2 and T = v‖A‖F + 1√2‖r‖.
The merit of Lemma 5 is that it helps decomposing a sum of
dependent random variables into sums of independent random
variables. This idea has been used extensively in the literature
of probability theory; see, e.g., [28], [29].
Next, we concentrate on deriving convex restrictions of (16)
and (17) based on the LDI approach using Lemma 5. For
equation (16), we set
ζi = tr
(
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
)
+ τH,i, (35)
TH,i = v‖ −R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i‖F
+
1√
2
‖ −R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i‖. (36)
Here v is obtained from the solution to the following quadratic
equation
v¯v = (1− 1/(2v2))v =
√
− ln(p) (37)
such that v > 1√
2
. It has been shown in [21] that such
a v must always exist, since (1 − 1/(2v2))v = 0 when
v = 1√
2
and (1 − 1/(2v2))v is a monotonically increas-
ing function of v within the interval [ 1√
2
,∞). Now from
(37), we conclude that p = exp (−(v¯v)2). Furthermore,
according to Lemma 5, the chance constraint (16) will be
satisfied if we choose ζi = 2
√− ln(p)TH,i for the interval
2
√− ln(p)TH,i ≤ ζi ≤ 2v¯vTH,i. On the other hand, if
ζi > 2v¯vTH,i = 2
√− ln(p)TH,i, then Lemma 5 yields
Pr
{
vHH,i
[
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
]
vH,i
+2ℜ
{
vHH,i
[
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)]
hˆe,i
}
+ τH,i ≤ 0
}
≤ exp
(
− v¯vζi
TH,i
+ (v¯v)2
)
< exp
(−(v¯v)2) = p, (38)
which essentially indicates that the chance constraint (16) will
still be satisfied. The resulting convex restriction can thus be
expressed as
tr(−R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i)+τH,i≥2
√
− ln(p)TH,i,∀i. (39)
Thus using the definition of TH,i, we obtain the following
system of second-order cone (SOC) constraints from (39) in
order to tackle the probabilistic constraint (16):


tr
(
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
)
+ τH,i≥2
√− ln(p)
× (ψ¯i + ω¯i) ,
1√
2
∥∥∥−R 12H,i (INe,i ⊗QI) hˆe,i∥∥∥ ≤ ψ¯i,
v
∥∥∥−R 12H,i (INe,i ⊗QI)R 12H,i∥∥∥
F
≤ ω¯i,
(40)
where ψ¯i, ω¯i ∈ R, ∀i, are slack variables. Similarly, defining
the slack variables ν¯k and ϕ¯k, the EH outage constraint (17)
can be expressed as


tr
(
R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k
)
+ gˆHk QIgˆk − ηkξk ≥ 2
√− ln(q)
× (ν¯k + ϕ¯k) ,
1√
2
∥∥∥R 12g,kQIgˆk∥∥∥ ≤ ν¯k,
v
∥∥∥R 12g,kQIR 12g,k∥∥∥
F
≤ ϕ¯k.
(41)
By applying the LDI method to the outage constrained prob-
lem (10), we obtain the convex restriction formulation of the
8power minimization problem as
min
QI,{ψ¯i},{ω¯i},{ν¯k},{ϕ¯k}
tr (QI) s.t. (42a)
tr
(
−R 12H,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i
)
+ τH,i
≥ 2
√
− ln(p)(ψ¯i+ ω¯i) , (42b)
1√
2
∥∥∥−R 12H,i (INe,i ⊗QI) hˆe,i∥∥∥ ≤ ψ¯i, (42c)
v
∥∥∥vec(−R 12H,i (INe,i ⊗QI)R 12H,i)∥∥∥ ≤ ω¯i, (42d)
tr
(
R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k
)
+ gˆHk QIgˆk −
ηk
ξk
≥ 2
√
− ln(q) (ν¯k + ϕ¯k) , (42e)
1√
2
∥∥∥R 12g,kQIgˆk∥∥∥ ≤ ν¯k, (42f)
v
∥∥∥vec(R 12g,kQIR 12g,k)∥∥∥ ≤ ϕ¯k, (42g)
QI  0, ψ¯i, ω¯i ≥ 0, ∀i, ν¯k, ϕ¯k ≥ 0, ∀k. (42h)
Since the above convex problem contains only SOC con-
straints, it can be solved more efficiently than the convex
restrictions obtained using BTI based and S-procedure based
approaches. Finally, the following theorem studies the tight-
ness of the rank relaxation in problem (10).
Theorem 3. Suppose that the relaxed problem (42) is feasible
for R > 0. The optimal solution must satisfy rank(QI) = 1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark. It can be verified that the optimal solutions to
problems (24), (33), and (42) obtained in Theorems 1, 2, and
3, respectively, are unique. Let us first consider that there are
two distinct optimal solutions to problem (24), say Q1 and Q2
,such that rank(Q1) = rank(Q2) = 1. Therefore, the range
spaces of Q1 and Q2 must be different. Following a basic
concept in convex optimization, any Q3 = λQ1 + (1− λ)Q2,
for λ ∈ (0, 1), is also an optimal solution of (24) [27]. Since
Q1 and Q2 are both rank-one and distinct, it is rigid that
Q3 is of rank two, which contradicts with the result proved in
Theorem 1. Hence problem (24) must have only one optimal
solution QI. Similarly, the uniqueness of the optimal solutions
of problems (33), and (42) can also be verified.
D. Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we mathematically characterize the com-
putational complexity of the proposed schemes. Note that the
convex restriction formulations (24), (33), and (42) involve
only LMI and SOC constraints, and hence can be solved
using standard interior-point methods (IPM) [30, Lecture 6].
Therefore, we can use the worst-case computation time of IPM
to compare the complexities of the three formulations. Now,
using the transformation
H
n ∋ S 7→
[
Re(S) −Im(S)
Im(S) Re(S)
]
∈ S2n,
where Sn and Hn represent the sets of n× n real symmetric
matrices and complex Hermitian matrices, respectively, we can
convert the complex-valued conic programs (24), (33), and
(42) into equivalent real-valued conic programs of the form
[21], [31]
min
z∈Rn
cT z
s.t.
n∑
i=1
ziA
j
i −Bj ∈ Skj+ for j = 1, . . . , p,
Tjz− bj ∈ Lkj for j = p+ 1, . . . ,m. (43)
Here, Tj ∈ Rkj×n, bj ∈ Rkj for j = p+ 1, . . . ,m, c ∈ Rn,
Sk+ is the set of k×k real PSD matrices, and Lk is the second-
order cone of dimention k ≥ 1. Now the overall complexity
of the IPM for solving the above problem consists of two
components:
a) Iteration Complexity: The number of iterations required to
reach an ǫ-accurate (ǫ > 0) optimal solution of problem
(43) is in the order of ln(1/ǫ)
√
β(K), where β(K) =∑p
j=1 kj+2(m−p) is known to be the barrier parameter.
b) Per-Iteration Computation Cost: A system of n linear
equations is required to be solved in each iteration. The
computation tasks include the formation of the coefficient
matrix H of the system of linear equations and the
factorization of H. The cost of forming H sums on the
order of κfor = n
∑p
j=1 k
3
j +n
2
∑p
j=1 k
2
j +n
∑m
j=p+1 k
2
j
while the cost of factorization is on the order of κfac = n3
[21].
Thus the overall computation cost for solving (43) using
IPM is on the order of ln(1/ǫ)
√
β(K)
× (κfor+κfac). Using these concepts, we can now analyze the
computational complexity of problems (24), (33), and (42).
Note that in all three formulations, the number of decision
variables (n in (43)) is on the order of N2T (ignoring the slack
variables). Let us first examine problem (24), which has L LMI
(trace) constraints of size 1, L SOC constraints (of size 2), L
LMI constraints of size NT, K LMI (trace) constraints of size
1, K SOC constraints, K LMI constraints of size NT, and in
(24h), 1 LMI constraints of size NT, 2L LMI constraints of
size 1, 2K LMI constraints of size 1. Thus the complexity of
the BTI-based algorithm is on the order shown in the first row
of Table I. Similarly, the complexity of the S-procedure based
approach and the LDI-based approach can be quantified as
shown in the second and the third row of Table I, respectively.
TABLE I
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES
Method Complexity Order (n = O(N2
T
))
BTI
ln(1/ǫ)
√
NT(K + L+ 1+)n[(K + L)(N
3
T
+ nN2
T
+3n+ 3) + (K + L)(N2
T
+NT + 1)
2 +N3
T
+nN2
T
+ n2]
S-procedure
ln(1/ǫ)
√
NT(K + L+ 1+)n[(K + L)(NT + 1)
3
+n(K + L)(NT + 1)
2 + n(N2
T
+K + L) +N3
T
+K + L]
LDI
ln(1/ǫ)
√
NT(K + L+ 1+)n[(N
3
T
+ 3K + 3L)
+n(N2
T
+ 3K + 3L) + (K + L)((N2
T
+ 1)2
+(NT + 1)
2) + n2]
From Table I, it is straightforward to show that LDI-based
method has the lowest computational complexity since it
9involves only SOC constraints, while the BTI-based approach
has the highest computational cost since it involves a more
complicated set of constraints. However, in terms of tightness,
the S-procedure based approach performs the worst, as evi-
denced by our numerical results.
IV. ROBUST SRM
In the robust power minimization problem considered in
Section III, attempt has been made to keep the transmit power
as low as possible yet maintaining the predefined secrecy
rate R, as well as the harvested energy, within the secrecy
outage probability. However, in many practical wireless com-
munication systems (e.g., secondary users’ transmission in
cognitive radio systems, small cell users’ transmission in
heterogeneous networks (HetNets)), the maximum allowable
transmission power is limited to a certain level so as to keep
the interference to other users below a given threshold. In those
scenarios, SRC power minimization problem (10) may turn out
to be infeasible [22], [32] and the designer may need to re-
adjust the secrecy rate requirement in order to find a feasible
solution. With insufficient channel knowledge, finding out the
appropriate secrecy rate requirement can be a tedious job.
Instead, a more attractive problem formulation can be to find
the maximum secrecy rate R that can be achieved subject to
the same outage constraints and the additional transmit power
constraint. Thus, the SRM problem with outage constraints for
a given maximum transmission power can be represented as
follows:
max
QI,R
R (44a)
s.t. Pr
[
min
i
{
CI (QI)− Cˆe,i (QI)
}+
≥ R
]
≥ 1− p, ∀i, (44b)
Pr
[
min
k
Eˆk ≥ ηk
]
≥ 1− q, ∀k, (44c)
tr (QI) ≤ PT, QI  0, (44d)
where PT is the maximum available transmission power
budget at the transmitter. This problem is not convex in terms
of the outage constraints. To make this problem more tractable,
we propose a two-stage optimization procedure as shown
below:
max
R


max
QI
R
s.t. Pr
[
min
i
{
CI (QI)− Cˆe,i (QI)
}+
≥ R
]
≥ 1− p, ∀i,
Pr
[
min
k
Eˆk ≥ ηk
]
≥ 1− q, ∀k,
tr (QI) ≤ PT, QI  0.
(45a)
(45b)
(45c)
(45d)
In the first stage, we solve the inner maximization problem
of (45) for any given feasible R. In the second stage, we
perform a one-dimensional line search over R that leads to the
optimal solution of the problem (44). Note that even with given
R, the problem is not tractable due to the probabilistic con-
straints. Hence we apply the safe approximation approaches
derived in the previous section for the probabilistic constraints.
A. SRM Based on BTI
According to Lemma 2, the BTI based convex restrictions
for constraints (45b) and (45c) are given by (22) and (23),
respectively, for given R. Thus, the safe approximation for
the inner maximization problem in (45) is given by
max
QI,{ψi},{ωi},{νk},{ϕk}
R (46a)
s.t. tr (QI) ≤ PT, (46b)
(24b)–(24h) satisfied. (46c)
Our next endeavour is to establish a link between the optimal
solutions of (24) and (46). If we can prove that the the optimal
solution of problem (24) is also optimal for problem (46),
then we can readily obtain the optimal solution to the inner
maximization problem in (45).
Proposition 1. Any optimal solution to the power minimiza-
tion problem (24) is also optimal to the problem (46) for
identical specifications.
Proof: The proof is identical to that of [10, Theorem 2]
and is thus omitted for brevity.
By Theorem 1, we know that the solution to the power
minimization problem (24) is rank-one optimal, so is the
solution of the problem (46) – we can immediately infer from
Proposition 1. The remaining task is to find the optimal R from
the second stage of problem (45). A simple one-dimensional
linear search (e.g., bisection or golden-section search) over R
to find the maximal R that solves the feasibility problem (45)
is sufficient. The lower boundary of the search is obviously 0
due to the assumption R > 0. The upper limit can be defined
by assuming that the system vintages the highest secrecy rate
at zero eavesdropping capacity i.e., at Ce,i = 0, ∀i. Thus, we
obtain the upper search limit from (44b) as
R ≤ log
(
1 +
1
σ2d
hHQIh
)
≤ log
(
1 +
1
σ2d
tr(QI)‖h‖2
)
≤ log
(
1 +
PT
σ2d
‖h‖2
)
. (47)
Note that the last inequality is derived using the sum power
constraint tr(QI) ≤ PT in (44d).
B. S-Procedure Based SRM
According to Lemma 4, the S-procedure based convex
restrictions for constraints (45b) and (45c) are given by (31)
and (32), respectively. As a result, a safe approximation for
the inner maximization problem in (45) is given by
max
QI,{µH,i},{µg,k}
R (48a)
s.t. tr (QI) ≤ PT, (48b)
(33b)–(33d) satisfied. (48c)
The following proposition establishes the solution equivalence
between (48) and (33).
Proposition 2. Any optimal solution to the power minimiza-
tion problem (33) is also optimal to the problem (48) for
identical specifications.
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Proof: The proof is identical to that of [10, Theorem 2]
and is thus omitted for brevity.
By Theorem 2, it is already known that the optimal solution
to the power minimization problem (33) yields a rank-one
transmit covariance QI. Hence, the solution to the problem
(48) should also be of unit-rank. The remaining task is to find
the optimal R for problem (45) through a one-dimensional
line search as described in Subsection IV-A.
C. LDI Based SRM
Similar to the BTI and the S-procedure based approaches, a
convex safe approximation for the inner maximization problem
in (45) is given by Lemma 5 as
max
QI,{ψ¯i},{ω¯i},{ν¯k},{ϕ¯k}
R (49a)
s.t. tr (QI) ≤ PT, (49b)
(42b)–(42h) satisfied, (49c)
which can be efficiently solved using existing solvers [26]. The
solution obtained is identical to that of the power minimization
problem (42) as described by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Any optimal solution to the power minimiza-
tion problem (42) is also optimal to the problem (49) for
identical specifications.
Proof: The proof is identical to that of [10, Theorem 2]
and is thus omitted for brevity.
The solution has been proved to be rank-one optimal in
Theorem 3. Finally, a line search is performed to find the
optimal R as described in Subsection IV-A.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Here, we study the performance of the proposed algorithms
in MISO secrecy SWIPT systems with probabilistic constraints
through numerical simulations. For simplicity, it was assumed
that ηk = η, ξk = 1, ∀k, Ne,i = Ne, ∀i, p = q = ρ, σ2d =
σ2e = 1, dI = dh,k = de,i = d. We set Lc = 35.97×10−4, (i.e.,
when GT = 18 dBi, GR = −2 dBi, c = 3 × 108, f = 1000
MHz), path loss exponent of κ¯ = 2.7, and distance d = 10
meters. In particular, we examine the case in which the QoS
requirements are such that each user is provided with an outage
probability of at most 10%; i.e., ρ = 0.1, unless otherwise
specified. We simulated a flat Rayleigh fading environment
where the channel vectors have entries with zero mean and
variance 1/NT.
Since Monte-Carlo simulations become prohibitively ex-
pensive under very low outage requirements for the convex
restriction approaches, the algorithms developed in this paper
are generally not recommended [21]. However, to illustrate
the performance of the proposed approaches in a larger error
domain, we average the results over 500 realizations of the
estimated channels.
We start the performance analysis of the proposed convex
restriction formulations by comparing their feasibility rates,
i.e., the chance of getting a feasible solution to the problem
(10) in 500 realizations of the estimated channels. Fig. 2 shows
the feasibility rates of the three approaches for NT = 6,
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Fig. 2. Feasibility rates of the proposed methods with NT = 6, K = L =
Ne = 3, and η = 0 (dB).
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Fig. 3. Transmit power versus secrecy outage requirement R with NT = 8,
K = 3, L = Ne = 2, and η = 10, 15 (dBm).
K = L = Ne = 3, and η = 0 (dB). Interestingly, the
S-procedure based approach has the lowest feasibility rate
compared to the other two methods. The BTI-based and the
LDI-based approaches yield almost the same feasibility rate.
Therefore, one would expect the worst performance from the
S-procedure based approach in terms of secrecy rate as well
as transmit power which we will observe in the remaining
examples.
In the next example, we compare the transmit power con-
sumptions of the proposed robust convex restriction solutions
with that of the conventional perfect eavesdroppers’ CSI based
non-robust approach [25] for problem (10). In the non-robust
scheme, the estimated CSIs have been used for designing
the transmit covariance matrix. Fig. 3 shows the transmit
power required by various methods against the rate outage
threshold R with NT = 8, K = 3, L = 2, Ne = 2.
We plot the results for η = 10 (dBm) and η = 15 (dBm).
As can be seen from Fig. 3, the BTI-based approach yields
slightly better transmit power performance compared to the
LDI-based restriction approach. However, the S-procedure
based approach performs the worst amongst the proposed
approaches. Interestingly, the robust algorithms guarantee the
probabilistic constraints costing very little additional transmit
power compared to the non-robust scheme. Obviously, with
the increase in the required secrecy rate, all the algorithms
demand higher transmit power.
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Fig. 4. Transmit power versus EH outage requirement η with NT = 8,
K = 3, L = Ne = 2, and R = 3, 5 (bps/Hz).
The results in Fig. 3 indicate that when the EH requirement
is increased from η = −10 (dB) to η = 0 (dB), all the
approaches require more transmit power to satisfy the more de-
manding constraints. Hence, in the next example, we illustrate
the transmit power consumptions of the solutions against the
EH requirements. Fig. 4 shows the required transmit power
versus the EH outage threshold η with NT = 8, K = 3,
L = 2, Ne = 2. We plot the results for R = 3 and R = 5
(bps/Hz). The results in Fig. 4 show identical characteristics of
the probabilistic restriction solutions as those in Fig. 3. Again,
with increased EH outage requirement, all the algorithms
demand higher transmit power.
Next, we examine the secrecy rate performance of the
proposed safe approximation approaches for the SRM problem
(44). Fig. 5 plots the worst-user secrecy rates of the various
methods against the transmit power constraint PT for outage
tolerance of 5% and 10% for both the secrecy rate and EH
constraints. As a baseline scheme, we also plot the secrecy
rate of the classic maximal ratio transmission (MRT) scheme.
In the MRT scheme, we pick the IR’s channel direction for
transmit beamforming assuming no eavesdropper is present.
Specifically, the transmit covariance matrix is defined as
QI =
(
PT
‖h‖2
)
hhH . Hence, it is a very suboptimal method
and undergoes severe performance degradation compared with
the proposed robust schemes. We set other parameters as
NT = 8, K = L = 3, Ne = 2, and η = −5 (dB). As we
can see, the BTI- and LDI-based approaches yield almost
identical worst-user secrecy rate whereas the S-procedure
based approach has noticeable degradation. Since the secrecy
rate Cs in (6) is an increasing function of the transmit power
tr(QI), one can notice identical reflections in the results of
Fig. 5 with increasing PT. Also, it is no surprise that stricter
outage constraint (ρ = 0.05) guarantees higher secrecy rate
compared to relaxed outage constraint (ρ = 0.1). However, this
observation does not apply to the conventional MRT scheme
since it does not satisfy the outage constraints.
Finally, we analyze the achievable worst-user secrecy rate
behaviors of the various methods when the number of eaves-
droppers is increased. The achievable secrecy rate versus the
number of eavesdroppers (i.e., L) is shown in Fig. 6 with
NT = 6, K = 3, Ne = 2, PT = 15 (dB), and η = −5
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rate by the proposed algorithms versus PT with
NT = 8, K = L = Ne = 3, and η = −5.
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Fig. 6. The secrecy rate for different number of the eavesdroppers with
NT = 6, K = 3, Ne = 2, PT = 15, 20 (dB), and η = −5 (dB).
(dB). It can be observed from this result that the worst-
user secrecy rate decreases as more eavesdroppers are present
which is reasonable since it is more likely to find an Eve
with stronger channel (resulting in worse secrecy) among an
increased number of Eves. As we observed in the previous
examples, the BTI- and LDI-based schemes outperform the
S-Procedure based one in terms of the achievable secrecy rate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the power minimization as well
as the SRM problems with probabilistic QoS constraints in
MISOME systems for SWIPT and proposed convex safe
approximation based transmit beamforming algorithms with
imperfect CSI. Applying SDR techniques, we showed that
rank-one optimal transmit covariance solutions are always ob-
tainable for the safe approximation approaches. In particular,
we found the maximum achievable secrecy rate under transmit
power and outage constraints through optimally solving the
power minimization problem. Simulation results have been
provided to demonstrate the performance of the proposed
approaches.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We start the proof by eliminating QI from the constraints
(24c) and (24f) such that these two constraints become irrel-
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evant to proof of rank of QI. Note that the SOC program
(SOCP) constraint (24c) can be equivalently expressed as
√∥∥∥R 12H,i (INe,i⊗QI)R 12H,i∥∥∥2
F
+ 2
∥∥∥R 12H,i (INe,i⊗QI) hˆe,i∥∥∥2
≤
√∥∥∥R 12H,i (INe,i⊗QI)∥∥∥2
F
(∥∥∥R 12H,i∥∥∥2
F
+ 2
∥∥∥hˆe,i∥∥∥2
)
=⇒ tr
((
INe,i⊗QI
) (
INe,i⊗QI
)H) ≤ ψ2i
αi
, (50)
where αi , tr2 (RH,i) + 2tr (RH,i) ‖hˆe,i‖2.
Applying the matrix trace identities
tr [(A⊗B)(C⊗D)] = tr(AC ⊗ BD), tr(A ⊗
B) = tr(A)tr(B) [33] and (14c), we obtain
tr
((
INe,i⊗QI
) (
INe,i⊗QI
)H)
= tr
(
INe,i ⊗QIQHI
)
=
Ne,itr
(
QIQ
H
I
)
. Thus, (50) can be rewritten as
tr
(
QIQ
H
I
) ≤ ψ2i
αiNe,i
⇒ QIQHI ≤ κ2i INT
⇒
[
κiINT QI
QHI κiINT
]
 0, (51)
where κ2i ,
ψ2i
αiNe,i
. Now we rewrite the constraint (51) as the
following LMI:
[
κiINT 0
0 κiINT
]
+
[
0 QI
QHI 0
]
 0, (52)
which can be eventually rewritten as
[
κiINT 0
0 κiINT
]

[
INT
0
]
QI
[
0 −INT
]
+
[
0
−INT
]
QHI
× [INT 0] , ‖QI‖ ≤ κi. (53)
The following lemma transforms the LMI in (53) into a more
convenient form.
Lemma 6 (Nemirovski lemma). [34, Lemma 2] Given
matrices A, B, C with A = AH ,
A  BHXC+CHXHB, ∀ X : ‖X‖ ≤ κ,
if and only if there exists a β ≥ 0 such that
[
A− βCHC −κBH
−κB βI
]
 0.
The merit of Lemma 6 is that it transforms matrix inequali-
ties into LMIs which do not involve the matrix variable. Based
on Lemma 6, we obtain (54) (at the top of the next page) from
(53). Similarly, the SOCP constraint (24f) can be rewritten as
(55), where ϕ2k , ν
2
k
tr2(Rg,k)+2tr(Rg,k)‖gˆk‖2 . Indeed, the SOCP
constraints (24c) and (24f) have been rewritten without QI in
(54) and (55), respectively.
The Lagrangian dual function of problem (24) is given by
L (QI,Z, λi,Ci, µk,Dk) , tr (QI)−tr (ZQI)+
L∑
i=1
Ne,i∑
n=1
λi
× tr
(
Ψ
(n,n)
i QI
)
+
L∑
i=1
Ne,i∑
n=1
tr
(
Φ
(n,n)
i QI
)
+
L∑
i=1
λi
(
− σ
2
e
2Rσ2d
×tr(hhHQI) +
√
−2 ln(p)ψi − ln(p)ωi − σ
2
e
2R
+ σ2e
)
−
L∑
i=1
tr (ωiCi)−
K∑
k=1
µktr
(
Rg,kQI + gˆkgˆ
H
k QI
)− K∑
k=1
tr (ϕk
×Dk +R
1
2
g,kDkR
1
2
g,kQI
)
+
K∑
k=1
µk
(√
−2 ln(q)νk − ln(q)ϕk
+
ηk
ξk
)
, (56)
where Z, λi,Ci, µk,Dk are the Lagrangian dual variables
associated with QI, (24b), (24d), (24e), and (24g), re-
spectively. For notational convenience, Ψ(n,n)i and Φ
(n,n)
i
are also defined as the diagonal block sub-matrices of
RH,i + hˆe,ihˆ
H
e,i and R
1
2
H,iCiR
1
2
H,i, respectively. In particu-
lar, RH,i+ hˆe,ihˆHe,i =


Ψ
(1,1)
i · · · Ψ(1,Ne,i)i
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ψ
(Ne,i,1)
i · · · Ψ(Ne,i,Ne,i)i

 and
R
1
2
H,iCiR
1
2
H,i =


Φ
(1,1)
i · · · Φ(1,Ne,i)i
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Φ
(Ne,i,1)
i · · · Φ(Ne,i,Ne,i)i

. The relevant
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions can be defined as
∂L (QI,Z, λi,Ci, µk,Dk)
∂QI
= 0, (57a)
ZQI = 0, QI  0, (57b)
Z  0 λi ≥ 0, Ci  0, ∀i, µk ≥ 0,Dk  0, ∀k. (57c)
Next, we prove that there exists at least one λi > 0 such
that t , σ
2
e
∑L
i=1 λi
2Rσ2
d
is always positive definite. Denoting τ ,∑L
i=1 λi
(
− σ2e2R + σ2e
)
+
∑K
k=1
µkηk
ξk
that includes the terms
in the Lagrangian dual function (56) not involving the primal
variables, the dual problem of (24) is given by
min
Z,{λi},{Ci},{µk},{Dk}
L∑
i=1
λi
(
σ2e
2R
− σ2e
)
−
K∑
k=1
µkηk
ξk
(58a)
s.t. Z  0 λi ≥ 0, Ci  0, ∀i, (58b)
µk ≥ 0,Dk  0, ∀k. (58c)
Note that the primal problem (24) is convex and it can be
easily verified that the problem satisfies Slater’s condition
[27]. Therefore, the duality gap is zero. Now, in order to
successfully transfer information to the legitimate destination,
the transmit power tr (QI), which is the objective function of
the primal problem (24), must be greater than zero. Therefore,
the strict positivity
∑L
i=1 λi
(
σ2e
2R − σ2e
)
− ∑Kk=1 µkηkξk > 0
must also hold.
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

[
κiINT 0
0 κiINT
]
− β1
[
0
−INT
] [
0 −INT
] −κi
[
INT
0
]
−κi
[
INT 0
]
β1INT

  0. (54)


[
ϕkINT 0
0 ϕkINT
]
− β2
[
0
−INT
] [
0 −INT
] −ϕk
[
INT
0
]
−ϕk
[
INT 0
]
β2INT

  0. (55)
Let us now assume that λi = 0, ∀i. Then it can be easily
observed that
∑L
i=1 λi
(
σ2e
2R − σ2e
)
−∑Kk=1 µkηkξk ≤ 0 for µk ≥
0, ∀k, which contradicts with the already established fact. Thus
we claim that there exists at least one i for which λi > 0 and
hence t > 0 must also hold.
Now, according to KKT condition (57a), we obtain
INT+
L∑
i=1
Ne,i∑
n=1
λiΨ
(n,n)
i +
L∑
i=1
Ne,i∑
n=1
Φ
(n,n)
i −
L∑
i=1
λi
σ2e
2Rσ2d
hhH
−
K∑
k=1
µk
(
Rg,k + gˆkgˆ
H
k
)− K∑
k=1
R
1
2
g,kDkR
1
2
g,k = Z. (59)
Let X , INT+
∑L
i=1
∑Ne,i
n=1 λiΨ
(n,n)
i +
∑L
i=1
∑Ne,i
n=1Φ
(n,n)
i −∑K
k=1 µk
(
Rg,k + gˆkgˆ
H
k
) −∑Kk=1R 12g,kDkR 12g,k. Thus Z =
X − thhH . From KKT condition (57b), we have ZQI = 0.
Furthermore, it can be verified that in order to meet the secrecy
rate constraints, it must hold that QI 6= 0, or equivalently,
rank (QI) ≥ 1. Then from (57b), it follows that rank (Z) ≤
NT − 1.
A key step in the proof of rank-one solution with secrecy
constraints is proving that the matrix X is positive definite.
Note that for secrecy problems without the EH constraints, the
last two negative terms in the expression of X do not appear,
and hence is readily established, see e.g., in [22]. In contrast,
for problems with EH constraints, this is a key challenging
step which we overcome as follows.
Let rX , rank (X) denote the rank of X. According to
[10, Lemma 5], it holds true that rank (A−B) ≥ rank(A)−
rank(B) for two matrices A and B of the same dimension.
Thus rank (Z) ≥ rank (X)− rank (thhH) = rX − 1.
If X is positive-definite, rX = NT and rank(Z) ≥ NT− 1.
However, if rank(Z) = NT, i.e., Z is of full-rank, then it
follows from (57b) that QI = 0, which cannot be an optimal
solution to (24). Therefore, we have rank(Z) = NT − 1.
According to (57b), we have rank(QI) = 1.
For the case when rX < NT, let Π =
[pi1,pi2, . . . ,piNT−rX ] with ΠHΠ = INT−rX denote
the orthogonal basis for the null space of X, i.e., XΠ = 0.
Then we have
piHi Zpii = pi
H
i
(
X− thhH)pii = −t|hHpii|2 ≤ 0,
for i = 1, . . . , NT − rX. (60)
To guarantee that the Lagrangian in (56) is bounded from
below such that the dual function exists, it follows that Z  0.
Since Z  0, it follows from (60) that hHpii = 0, ∀i, given
t > 0. That is,
hhHΠ = 0. (61)
As a result, we have
ZΠ = 0. (62)
However, no information will be transferred to the IR in this
case since all pii’s lie in the null space of hhH according
to (61) [9, Proof of Proposition 4.1]. Hence positive secrecy
rate constraint in (10b) cannot be satisfied in this case, which
contradicts with the assumption R > 0. Thus rX = NT must
hold, which implies that X is positive definite and rank (Z) ≥
NT − 1.
Combining this result with rank (Z) ≤ NT − 1, it follows
that rank (Z) = NT − 1. Accordingly, from (57b), we have
rank (QI) = nullity(Z) = NT − rank (Z) = 1. (63)
Theorem 1 is thus proved. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
By defining
ΣH,i,
[
R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i R
1
2
H,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
hˆe,i
hˆHe,i
(
INe,i⊗QI
)
R
1
2
H,i hˆ
H
e,i
(
INe,i ⊗QI
)
hˆe,i
]
,
ΛH,i ,
[
µH,iINTNe,i 0
0
σ2e
2R
− σ2e − µH,iγ2e
]
,
Θi (QI, µH,i) in (31) can be decomposed as
Θi (QI, µH,i) = −
[
R
1
2
H,i hˆe,i
]H (
INe,i⊗QI
) [
R
1
2
H,i hˆe,i
]
+ΛH,i +
σ2e
2Rσ2d
[0 h]
H
QI [0 h] . (64)
Similarly, denoting Σg,k ,
[
R
1
2
g,kQIR
1
2
g,k R
1
2
g,kQIgˆk
gˆHk QIR
1
2
g,k gˆ
H
k QIgˆk
]
and Λg,k ,
[
µg,kINT 0
0 ηk
ξk
− µg,kγ2e
]
, we
obtain Υk (QI, µg,k) = Σg,k + Λg,k =[
R
1
2
g,k gˆk
]H
QI
[
R
1
2
g,k gˆk
]
+ Λg,k from (32). Let us
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now define the Lagrangian dual function of problem (33):
L (QI,Z,VH,i,Vg,k) , tr (QI)− tr (ZQI)
+
L∑
i=1
Ne,i∑
n=1
tr
(
Ω
(n,n)
i QI
)
−
L∑
i=1
tr (VH,iΛH,i)−
K∑
k=1
tr (Vg,k
×Λg,k)−
K∑
k=1
tr
(
Vg,k
[
R
1
2
g,k gˆk
]H
QI
[
R
1
2
g,k gˆk
])
− σ
2
e
2Rσ2d
L∑
i=1
tr
(
VH,i [0 h]
H
QI [0 h]
)
, (65)
where Z,VH,i,Vg,k are the Lagrangian dual variables asso-
ciated with QI, (33b), and (33c), respectively. For notational
convenience, Ω(n,n)i ∈ HNT+ is defined as the diagonal block
sub-matrices of
[
R
1
2
H,i hˆe,i
]
VH,i
[
R
1
2
H,i hˆe,i
]H
. In particu-
lar,
[
R
1
2
H,i hˆe,i
]
VH,i
[
R
1
2
H,i hˆe,i
]H
=


Ω
(1,1)
i · · · Ω(1,Ne,i)i
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ω
(Ne,i,1)
i · · · Ω(Ne,i,Ne,i)i

 . (66)
The KKT conditions relevant to the proof can be defined as
∂L (QI,Z,VH,i,Vg,k)
∂QI
= 0, (67a)
ZQI = 0, QI  0, (67b)
Z  0 VH,i  0, ∀i,Vg,k  0, ∀k. (67c)
Next, we prove that T , σ
2
e
2Rσ2
d
∑L
i=1VH,i is
always positive definite by contradiction. Denoting
τS ,
∑L
i=1 tr
(
VH,i
[
0 0
0
σ2e
2R − σ2e
])
−
∑K
k=1 tr
(
Vg,k
[
0 0
0 − ηk
ξk
])
that includes the terms
in the Lagrangian dual function not involving the primal
variables, the dual problem of (33) is given by
min
Z,{VH,i},{Vg,k}
− τS (68a)
s.t. Z  0, VH,i  0,Vg,k  0, ∀i, k. (68b)
Note that the primal problem (33) is convex and it can be easily
verified that the problem satisfies Slater’s condition [27]. Thus
the duality gap is zero. Now, in order to successfully transfer
information to the legitimate destination, the transmit power
tr (QI), which is the objective function of the primal problem
(33), must be greater than zero. Therefore, the strict positivity
on the objective of the dual problem (68) must also hold.
Now, if VH,i = 0, ∀i, resulting in T = 0, then it can
be easily observed that τS ≤ 0 for Vg,k  0, ∀k, which
contradicts with the already established fact. Thus we claim
that T ≻ 0 must also hold.
According to KKT condition (67a), we obtain
XS − [0 h]T [0 h]H = Z, (69)
where XS , INT +
∑L
i=1
∑Ne,i
n=1Ω
(n,n)
i −∑K
k=1
[
R
1
2
g,k gˆk
]
Vg,k
[
R
1
2
g,k gˆk
]H
. From KKT condition
(67b), we have ZQI = 0. Furthermore, it can be verified that
in order to meet the secrecy rate constraints, it must hold that
QI 6= 0, or equivalently, rank (QI) ≥ 1. Then from (57b), it
follows that rank (Z) ≤ NT − 1.
Following similar reasoning as in Appendix A, it
can be proved by contradiction that XS ≻ 0. Ap-
plying [10, Lemma 5], rank (Z) ≥ rank (XS) −
rank
(
[0 h]T [0 h]
H
)
= NT−1. Combining this argument
with rank (Z) ≤ NT − 1, it follows that rank (Z) = NT − 1.
Accordingly, from (57b), rank (QI) = 1. 
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Applying Lemma 6 (Nemirovski lemma), constraints (42c),
(42d), (42f), and (42g) can be equivalently transformed into
LMIs not involving QI. Therefore, we ignore these constraints
in the proof of rank-one QI as in Appendix A. Accordingly,
the Lagrangian of (42) is given by
L (QI,Z,λ) , tr (QI)−tr (ZQI)+
L∑
i=1
Ne,i∑
n=1
λb,itr
(
Ψ
(n,n)
i QI
)
+
L∑
i=1
λb,i
(
− σ
2
e
2Rσ2d
hHQIh− σ
2
e
2R
+ σ2e + 2
√
− ln(p)
× (ψ¯i + ω¯i))− K∑
k=1
λe,ktr
(
Rg,kQI + gˆkgˆ
H
k QI
)
−
K∑
k=1
λe,k
(
−ηk
ξk
− 2
√
− ln(q) (ν¯k + ϕ¯k)
)
, (70)
where λ , [λb,1, . . . , λb,L, λe,1, . . . , λe,K ]T is the vector of
Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (42b) and
(42e), and Z is the Lagrangian dual variable associated with
QI. The KKT conditions can be defined as
∂L (QI,Z,λ)
∂QI
= 0, (71a)
ZQI = 0, QI  0, Z  0 λ ≥ 0. (71b)
Denoting τD ,
∑L
i=1 λb,i
(
− σ2e
2R
+ σ2e
)
+
∑K
k=1 λe,k
ηk
ξk
in
(58), the dual problem can be defined as
max
Z,λ
− τD (72a)
s.t. QI, Z  0 λ ≥ 0. (72b)
Following similar arguments as in Appendix A, it can be
shown that there exists at least one λb,i > 0. The rest of the
proof is identical to the corresponding part in Appendix A,
and thus is omitted for brevity. 
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